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19980630 033

## Operations other than War

Who Says Warriors  
Don't Do Windows?



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Air War College  
Maxwell Paper No. 13

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MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

March 1998

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## **Foreword**


This study examines the rise of operations other than war (OOTW) as a new and prominent tasking for the armed services of the United States. The author, Lt Col Charles W. Hasskamp, USAF, is an advocate of the OOTW mission, and he argues that the US Special Forces Command is an excellent instrument for the task.

The author bases his position on these points. First, the end of the cold war has provided the United States a respite from the focused geopolitical strategy and challenge of "containment." Unfortunately, without the stability coerced by a bipolar world, the shutters have come off and the shades have gone up on "windows" that reveal a new world disorder. While the world has an increasingly interdependent global economy, the legacies of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, drug trafficking, and religious and ethnic extremism generate increasing threats to that free-market, democratic ideal the American public espouses for all countries. Second, the US government's current national security strategy emphasizes "engagement and enlargement" as they factor into US preventive diplomacy. The national military strategy emphasizes "flexible and selective engagement" which relates to preventive deterrence. Both of these strategies emphasize the use of US military forces for considerable work other than fighting the nation's wars—that is, for OOTW.

As recent experience shows, there is considerable pressure to use the American military as an arbitrator and peacemaker to the world. This study examines the arguments for and against expanding our military's nontraditional roles and missions. It concludes that the US armed forces can do and will continue to be able to perform an excellent job in operations other than war, as they have done in the past. The danger is that this endeavor could jeopardize the readiness of a force structure necessary to maintain the more traditional war-fighting capabilities. The study suggests that an actually smaller force and smaller defense budget can still accomplish the primary mission of fighting the nation's wars while also undertaking the myriad of peacetime engagements and conflict pre-

ventions our leaders have ordered. Moreover, the Special Operations Command, which has the skill and will to serve well in the full spectrum of armed conflict, also has the cultural, social, and technical know-how to perform the more complex chores of nation building and humanitarian operations.

As we wrestle with the ongoing parade of "opportunities" that continue to present themselves in the new world disorder, we will do well to consider Lieutenant Colonel Hasskamp's means of doing more with fewer.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Timothy A. Kinnan", written over a stylized, angular graphic element that resembles a wing or a stylized letter 'K'.

TIMOTHY A. KINNAN  
Major General, USAF  
Commandant  
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## **Operations other than War**

### **Who Says Warriors Don't Do Windows?**

*Our planet will be filled with barbarism for a long time to come. Violence is epidemic in this post-cold-war [era] of raging national, religious, ethnic, and racial conflict. When vital US interests are directly threatened, of course we must be prepared to fight. But in many cases we must accept the sad necessity of living with tragedies that are beyond our power to control or our wisdom to cure. What President Kennedy said in 1961 applies more than ever today: "We must face the fact that the US is neither omnipotent nor omniscient—that we are only 6% of the world's population—that we cannot impose our will upon the other 94%—that we cannot right every wrong or reverse each adversity—and that therefore there cannot be an American solution to every world problem."*

—Arthur D. Schlesinger Jr.

The above perspective on what United States foreign policy should be is not much different from the perspective that many governments have of their responsibilities in their more limited areas of activity. For example, on a US military-to-military assistance visit to Chad in 1996, the American contingent was attempting to convince the Chad armed forces leadership that they should use their country's military resources to improve Chad's social, economic, and political stability by doing public works and civil affairs. Chad military personnel, trained as traditional, elitist warriors, refused even to talk about such proposals. This frustrated the American contingent and prompted one listener to observe that "obviously, warriors don't do windows," at least in Chad.<sup>1</sup>

Should the United States military be this constrained? Can and should they be limited to only fighting and winning the nation's traditional, conventional wars? If our military is going to be tasked to do operations other than war (OOTW), what force structure could both be ready to fight wars (destroy houses) and routinely to resolve conflicts short of war (clean windows)—to do such chores as nation building, counterdrug/counterterrorist operations, arms control, and peace operations?

The purpose of this study is to analyze the implications of the apparent paradigm shift in what our civilian leaders require—and that elements of the citizenry expect—of the US military instrument of power. With the cold war over, our

national security strategy includes the reaffirmation of democracy as a primary objective and the promotion of global free market economics to consolidate and strengthen democratic gains. Achieving these ends requires a peaceful process for resolving societal conflicts, for generating needed reforms, and for making transitions in governments. Since the United States has no "peer competitor" or major military threat in the short term, nonvital and often humanitarian concerns are consuming larger portions of US military budgets and personnel. This study argues that this new emphasis is a viable and relevant focus for our country and that the military clearly has the duty, competency, and capability to shoulder these roles and missions.

This study addresses *why* the US military can do these chores, despite contrary arguments, and *who* within the armed forces is already doing these extraordinary missions and can continue to do them without compromising operational readiness or fiscal parameters. The OOTW mission does require a new cooperation and coordination with national and international nonmilitary agencies, organizations, and coalitions to achieve its objectives. Success or failure in achieving these objectives is often not easy to determine. Regardless of the opposition, difficulties, and potential long-term nature of these taskings, both the pains and the "panes" can be and should be resolved by a greater emphasis and expansion of our existing "warrior-diplomat" organization—the Special Operations Forces.

### **Has the World Changed Its "Housekeeping" Needs?**

*The world now taking shape is not only new but new in entirely new ways. Something is happening to the nation-state itself. Governments, everywhere, irrespective of ideology, appear inadequate to the new challenges.*

—Richard J. Barnet

According to the National Defense University's Institute for National Strategic Studies, analysis of the emerging international system now needs at least three geostrategic perspectives: from the top down, major powers have changed; among states, there are categories determined by success at



establishing democracy and free-market prosperity; and from the bottom up, transnational problems have become a more important part of the world scene.<sup>2</sup> In addition, the overriding characteristics of the world's environment involve uncertainties and changes which seem more numerous and complex than during the cold war. Have the major powers and their relationships changed? At the end of the cold war some argued that the United States had become the sole major power. However, the US has not shown a proclivity to dominate the world to the detriment of those countries that previously had major status. While some aspects of cooperation between these powers may have diminished over time, disagreements remain open to discussion and negotiation, and antagonistic economic and political blocs have not been consolidated. Clashes among the great powers do not seem likely in the near future.

The cold war's end also terminated the categorizing of states based on an industrialized free world, a communist world, and an underdeveloped third world. Categories of states in the new world order (or disorder) might now be more effectively characterized as:

1. *market democracies*: free, prosperous, and being joined by newly industrialized countries in East Asia, parts of Latin America, and Central Europe;
2. *transitional states*: ex-communist, India, South Africa, progressing from lower economic baselines, but creating dilemmas for freedom and prosperity by semiauthoritarian politics;
3. *troubled states*: primarily in Africa, falling behind economically, politically, and ecologically and plagued with ethnic and/or religious extremism.<sup>3</sup>

Still another international characterization would classify states by "tiers." The "first tier" countries form the core of developed economies with shared ideologies and minor conflicts, while the "second tier" is formed of one-time "third world" states. This second tier is further subdivided into those states that are developed economically, but fragile in terms of democracy; resource-rich nondemocracies with little developed infrastructure; partially developed with some qualitative economic improvement; and develop-

ing with some good prospects. Finally, the failed states and failing states are those where virtual anarchy exists or recently existed—countries like Somalia, Haiti, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Bosnia. Some failing states are actively becoming “failed states”—Ethiopia, Georgia, Zaire. Obviously, some countries have characteristics of more than one group.<sup>4</sup>

The “containment” effect of the cold war largely prevented the window panes of the global structure from breaking and showering glass onto states other than the superpowers. Unfortunately, the two sides often ignored the task of helping to build long-term, self-sustaining economic and political capabilities for the newer nations. Providing military and economic aid to weak and corrupt regimes did little to promote democratic politics, market economies, or the institutions to support them.<sup>5</sup> When the “shutters” came off, a number of the newer countries were revealed to be failed nation-states or close to that status.

One result is that global security problems have accelerated and are increasingly concentrated in the old third world countries; they can generally be categorized as being political, economic, ethnic, or religious in nature.<sup>6</sup> This is evidenced, for example, by recent conflicts and turmoil in Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, Liberia, and Haiti. These conflicts generate emotional appeals for humanitarian or peace operations regardless of relevance to fundamental US interests.

A listing of these pains/panes, from US Army Field Manual 100-5, *Operations*, gives a more graphic idea of the nature and extent of the “operations short of war” for which the United States and other countries are involved:

Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (Mogadishu)	Nation Assistance (Somalia)
Arms Control	Security Assistance
Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (Rwanda)	Peacekeeping (Bosnia)
Support to Domestic Authorities (Hurricane Andrew)	Counterdrug (Peru and Bolivia)
Counterterrorism (Achille Lauro)	Peace Enforcement (Haiti and Beirut)
Show of Force (Kuwait)	Attacks and Raids (Libya)

United Nations peacekeeping operations also provide a global view of some of the windows that the rest of the world has also thought deserved attention.<sup>7</sup>

UNTSO (Israel)	UNMOGIP (India-Pakistan)	UNFICYP (Cyprus)
UNDOF (Golan Heights)	UNIFIL (Lebanon)	UNIKOM (Iraq-Kuwait)
MINORSO (West Sahara)	UNOMIG (Georgia)	UNOMIL (Liberia)
UNMIH (Haiti)	UNAMIR (Rwanda)	UNMOT (Tajikistan)
UNAVEM (Angola)	UNPROFOR (Bosnia)	UNPREDEP (Macedonia)
UNMIBH (Bosnia)	UNMOP (Croatia)	UNTAES (East Slavonia)
UNEF I (Israel-Egypt)	UNOC (Congo)	UNTEA (West New Guinea)
UNYOM (Yemen)	UNEF II (Sinai)	UNIMOG (Iraq-Iran)
UNOSAL (El Salvador)	UNTAC (Cambodia)	UNOSOM (Somalia)

In short, the world has changed. The cold war's end showed what disorder lay underneath, and the globalization of security challenges has prompted numerous countries to prepare for and conduct nonmilitary operations.

### **The National Security Strategy**

How does the United States government view our country's role in dealing with the post-cold-war order and disorder? The Clinton administration's national security strategy (NSS) is premised on a belief that the line between US domestic and foreign policies is disappearing and that our economy must remain vital to sustain our foreign initiatives and our global influence.<sup>8</sup> But the strategy also identifies dangers that have become threats to our national well-being.

Currently, the NSS has three central objectives or components: enhancing security, bolstering economic prosperity, and promoting democracy. The administration sees these as mutually supportive:

Secure nations are more likely to support free trade and maintain democratic structures. Free market nations with growing economies and open trade ties are more likely to feel secure and work toward freedom and democratic states are less likely to threaten our interests and more likely to cooperate . . . to meet

security threats [and to] promote free trade and sustainable development. These goals are supported by ensuring America remains *engaged* in the world.<sup>9</sup>

These goals are also supported by "*enlarging*" the community of secure free-market and democratic nations. But this enlargement of the tasks is best defined when facing the threats of the new world order. Moreover, the NSS expands the use of various instruments of power, including the military, to protect not only the nation's "vital interests" but US interests and values more generally.

Within this context the NSS envisions measures to stop democratic reversals, enhance security with humanitarian assistance, stem disruption from refugee migrations, and improve infrastructure and economic conditions that are contributors to instability.<sup>10</sup> From this comes the expanded responsibility to keep threats from festering, to deter aggression, and to foster the peaceful resolution of dangerous conflicts. In the execution of this national strategy, military force is recognized as an "indispensable element" of the nation's power along with economic and political measures.<sup>11</sup>

The primary focus of US military involvement is on enhancing US national security. Military forces are also planned as critical to the success of this strategy. The US must deploy robust and flexible military forces that can face four principal dangers:

1. Weapons of mass destruction—nuclear, biological, chemical.
2. Regional instability—border disputes; ethnic, religious, and territorial aggression.
3. Transnational dangers—terrorism, drug trafficking, refugee migration.
4. Dangers to democracy and reform—humanitarian and disaster relief.<sup>12</sup>

The latter two categories specifically call for specialized units and capabilities.

Peace operations are clearly identified as a means to support the national security strategy.<sup>13</sup> In peace operations the national strategy envisions certain military assets supporting the situation before a combat response is required. Airlift, intelligence, and communications will con-

tinue to be offered. In meeting the goals of promoting democracy, military forces are also inextricably involved. The strategy emphasizes that these resources will be used to deal with torture, tyranny, and repression for ideological and moral reasons, as well as pragmatic ones.

### **The National Military Strategy**

The US armed forces, assigned the duty of performing OOTW, have at least given lip service to that duty by incorporating these missions into their own national military strategy (NMS). The strategy is one of flexible and selective engagement that accepts the challenge of the "new strategic era" to advance US national interests in peacetime. The objectives, components, and tasks are represented in Table 1.<sup>14</sup>

Peacetime engagement describes noncombat activities that US military members engage in daily worldwide. The

**Table 1**

#### **Achieving National Military Objectives**

Promote Stability through Regional Cooperation and Constructive Interaction		Thwart Aggression through Credible Deterrence and Robust War-fighting Capabilities			
Peacetime Engagement		Deterrence and Conflict Prevention		Fight and Win	
Military-to-Military Contacts		Nuclear Deterrence		Clear Objective- Decisive Force	
Nation Assistance		Regional Alliances		War Power Projection	
Security Assistance		Crisis Response		Fight Combined/Joint	
Humanitarian Operations		Arms Control		Win Information War	
Counterdrug/terrorism		Noncombatant Evacuation		Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction	
Peacekeeping		Sanction Enforcement		Two Major- Regional-Conflict Focus	
		Peace Enforcement		Force Generation	
				Win the Peace	

**Source:** *National Military Strategy [NMS] 1995*, cover letter by CJCS Gen John Shalikashvili (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1995).

programs build stability by increasing mutual trust, familiarity, communication, training, interoperability, and educational exchanges. Nation assistance is designed to counter lawlessness, subversion, and insurgency. Security assistance is intended to reduce the need for a large US overseas presence. Humanitarian operations offer unique capabilities in logistics and security for responding to disasters and refugee contingencies. Peacekeeping is expressly recognized as "different from traditional military operations in the tasks and capabilities they require," but for which appropriate doctrine and training continues to be developed.<sup>15</sup> The NMS also envisions vigorous efforts in the deterrence and conflict prevention fields that include adapting regional alliances by facilitating participation in nontraditional out-of-area operations where the use of force or threat of force is interwoven with diplomatic and economic efforts, often involving both governmental and nongovernmental organizations (NGO). Finally, the national military strategy has the fundamental objective to fight and win the nation's wars. Power projection, joint war fighting, force generation, and handling two major regional contingencies are mentioned.<sup>16</sup>

This national military strategy, or plan, admits that the world's issues are more complex, more regional, and more diverse than before. It also acknowledges that combating the security dangers requires a high operational tempo with the need for "warriors" to be flexible, ready, and capable of responding quickly and decisively. However, the US armed forces have had to deal with serious budgetary concerns with no major threat on the horizon. The emphasis is on smaller, more efficient, integrated Guard-Reserve-active duty forces with limited presence overseas. Briefings at the Air War College in 1997 showed that in 1992 there was approximately a 25 percent reduction in military personnel pursuant to Gen Colin Powell's "base force"; in 1993 bombers, missiles, and other items were cut back as strategic arms reductions lowered forces 33 percent; in 1994 the "Bottoms-Up Review" forced a 40 percent reduction; and in 1997 the Quadrennial Defense Review, based on a balanced budget initiative, probably meant further reductions.<sup>17</sup>

Furthermore, the NMS expects that by 1999 the US military will see:

1. Total active end strength down from 2,130,000 to 1,445,000 people;
2. Army divisions decline from 18 to 10;
3. Air Force fighter wings drop from 24 to 13;
4. Navy battle force ships fall from 567 to 346;
5. Marine Corps force structure remain, but reduced by 23,000 personnel;
6. Selected Reserve decline from 1,170,000 to 894,000; and
7. Coast Guard end strength down from 44,000 to 36,300.<sup>18</sup>

These trends are further represented in Table 2 and Table 3 below.<sup>19</sup>

**Table 2**  
**Budget Trends**

Figures compiled by the Pentagon's comptroller show the downward trend in end strength and spending for each branch of the service between fiscal 1990 and fiscal 1997, which began 1 October. Spending figures are adjusted for inflation to 1997 dollars.

**End strengths for each service:**

Year	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Navy/ Marines	Air Force	Total
1990	751,000	583,000	197,000	780,000	539,000	2,070,000
1997	495,000	407,000	174,000	581,000	381,000	1,457,000
Change	-256,000	-176,000	-23,000	-199,000	-158,000	-613,000
% change	-34.1	-30.2	-11.7	-25.5	-29.3	-29.6

**Spending for each service (in billions of dollars):**

Year	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Navy/ Marines	Air Force	Total
1990	\$95.3	---	---	118.7	113.5	327.5
1997	61.2	---	---	75.8	72.3	209.3
Change	-34.1	---	---	-42.9	-41.2	-118.2
% change	-35.8	---	---	-36.1	-36.3	- 36.1

Source: Senior Air Force officer, address to Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 22 January 1997.

**Table 3**  
**Defense Spending**

Shown is the Clinton administration's budget proposal for fiscal 1998 and future years. Budget authority (spending commitments) for 1998 is \$2.8 billion above what the administration last year planned for 1998, but \$2.1 billion below the level Congress appropriated for 1997. While budget authority can reflect commitments of more than one year, budget outlays are the actual spending proposed in a given year. Figures are in billions.

	FY '97	FY '98	FY '99	FY '00	FY '01	FY '02
<b>Budget Authority</b>	\$250.0	\$250.7	\$256.3	\$262.8	\$269.6	\$277.5
<b>Outlays</b>	\$254.3	\$247.5	\$249.3	\$255.2	\$256.2	

Source: Senior Air Force officer, address to Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 22 January 1997.

With the prospects of doing more with less, the continued high "ops tempo" of certain units, and a concern for not having a sufficiently trained force for "war fighting," it is small wonder that criticism of the OOTW mission is heard. The popular refrains of "it's not my job," or "I'm here to fly and to fight," or "I signed on to fight, not feed," or "warriors don't do windows" are with us. But they do not reflect the operational future, nor the new world disorder that has produced these challenges.<sup>20</sup>

### **Strategy Says: Do the Windows (OOTW)**

*Constabulary missions are different from fighting and winning wars . . . more police-like than war-like. They are reactive more than proactive. . . . The purpose . . . is not to defeat an enemy, . . . there can be no expectation of winning any more than we can expect to win a war against crime . . . we can only hope to reduce violations to a more acceptable level. These are conditions for which neither our equipment nor our doctrine have been designed. We design our forces for speed, stealth, destructiveness, payload, and range. Our doctrine emphasizes surprise, initiative, freedom of action, mass, shock, and the principles of war. These qualities are only occasionally pertinent to constabulary missions.*

—Carl H. Builder



Lt Col Charles Dunlap, US Air Force (USAF), a National War College award-winning essayist and judge advocate, provocatively argues that the "armed forces [should] focus exclusively on indisputably military duties" and "not diffuse our energies away from our fundamental responsibilities for war-fighting."<sup>21</sup> Other concerns mentioned about doing OOTW are that it politicizes the military instead of professionalizing it and undermines civilian control; the tasks create a disinclination to be "fighters"; and the risk of casualties is not offset by easily recognizable national interests. Dunlap's points lend support to those arguing against restoration-of-democracy missions as in Haiti, humanitarian support to Rwanda and Somalia, counterdrug operations in Latin America, and a panoply of other peace operations. Others, like Doug Bandow, oppose intervention in Central Africa because we "compound foreign tragedies by making casualties of our fellow citizens."<sup>22</sup> He argues that the crises in the world are the same, only the victims differ, and


it is not right to expect 18-year-old Americans to be guardians of a de facto global empire, risking their lives when their own nation's security is not at stake. . . . Americans like to solve problems, but we can't put dissolving nation-states back together, and the underlying causes of bitter conflicts that go back centuries will not disappear with the presence of US soldiers. At worst we'll find ourselves taking sides and dying in a civil war like Lebanon.<sup>23</sup>

Donald Snow's graphic perspective of the never-ending new internal war cycle, shown in figure 1, illustrates the dilemmas. If there is no breaking this cycle, why get on the carousel?

David Sorenson writes that peacekeeping can have a drastic impact on the identity of "professional" soldiers.<sup>24</sup> The events surrounding operations in Lebanon (1983) and Somalia (1993) are to him "bitter experiences" that are reasons for avoiding low intensity conflict (LIC) and peace operations in the future.<sup>25</sup> Indeed, many US military are not adequately trained for operations other than war. Sorenson further elaborates:

1. Military duties are secondary to political, economic, and humanitarian concerns, which results in a decline of readiness and training.

2. Few feel that assignments in LIC or peace operations are career-enhancing, nor are they the best incentive for recruitment and retention.
3. In budgetary declines, war-fighting responsibilities should have emphasis.
4. LIC duty causes morale problems—policing is long-term boredom.
5. Massive application of force replaced by combat management is costly and inconclusive; the enemy is illusive and unidentifiable.
6. The traditional barriers between civilians and military will erode.<sup>26</sup>



Source: Donald M. Snow, "New Internal Wars," in *Uncivil Wars* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997), 120.

**Figure 1. New Internal War Cycle**

Furthermore, Morris Janowitz states, "The military establishment becomes a constabulary force when it is continuously prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force, and seeks viable international relations rather than victory, because it has incorporated a protective military posture."<sup>27</sup> Charles Moskos argues that rather than

being concerned only with the efficient achievement of victory, the "peacekeeper" is charged with maintaining the peace even to the detriment of military considerations.<sup>28</sup> These distinctions are set out in Army field manuals. FM 100-5, *Operations*, provides guidance on preconditioned responses for combat operations, including violent offensive action.<sup>29</sup> FM 100-23, *Peace Operations*, gives criteria for peace operations that include restraint, control of consent, level of violence, and impartiality.<sup>30</sup>

The resistance to the OOTW mission continues despite US national policy embracing operations other than war. Ever since the United States "won all the battles but lost the war" in Vietnam, many in the US military have taken a position that despite the primacy of civilian control, limited operations still need to meet certain rigorous criteria before the military is employed. For example, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, in a classic listing, argued that before US troops are committed:

1. "Vital" interests must be at stake.
2. The United States must commit in sufficient numbers to win.
3. Political and military objectives must be clearly defined.
4. Objectives and forces must be continually reassessed.
5. Support from the American people must be present.
6. Force is the means of last resort.<sup>31</sup>

As with most controversial decisions, however, the "bottom line" actually may be money. Difficult, complex, long-term operations require personnel, equipment, and other resources that, we have seen, have been in decline. Large portions of the US population, represented by Congress, are typically concerned with domestic issues rather than foreign policy. Without a clear military threat, budgetary restraints will always have influence on the military's attitude about OOTW, even if there are no other objections. But the problem is aggravated when forces being kept ready for war have their

funds depleted by *unplanned* OOTW. When this happens the military has to ask for reimbursement or special appropriations. In the meantime, normal readiness, training, and operations are suspended, and there is no incentive to engage in or expand these taskings in the future. The current defense secretary, William Cohen, recognized the funding/tasking dilemma: "We are faced with a choice of reducing our commitment or reducing our capability. . . . We're overcommitted and underfunded."<sup>32</sup>

### **Historical Experience**

*The distinction between warfare and crime is becoming less clear every day, especially when such lethal materials and expertise are being smuggled across borders, when organized crime groups are involved in smuggling everything from weapons of mass destruction, to drugs, to illegal aliens, and when terrorists maintain sophisticated international financial networks. . . . In the process of improving our defenses we must be mindful of our political traditions that separate civilian law enforcement from the military and limit government's intrusion into our lives, but these important sensitivities must not be allowed to paralyze us.*

—Senator Sam Nunn

Despite former senator Nunn's caveat, it is clear that the US military has been doing OOTW—"windows"—on a routine basis since its formation. Indeed, if one were to calculate the amount of time spent "doing wars" versus the years spent accomplishing the other economic, political, or social objectives that the armed forces have traditionally been used for, one could hardly consider such activities "outside the scope" of military employment. Figure 2 reflects a number of US military guided operations involving civil affairs, protection of US citizens and property in foreign countries, law enforcement, and humanitarian and disaster relief.

The complaint that the US military should not do constabulary missions is also not supported historically. The American military has been assigned numerous constabulary missions in peacetime and in the aftermath of wars. These include the pacification of our territorial west, the suppression of rebellions in the Philippines and Nicaragua, other operations during both world wars,

<b>Civil Affairs<sup>33</sup></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Exploration of America's West, roads, telegraphs, forts, and ports</li> <li>- Governmental authority in southern states and Alaska</li> <li>- Panama Canal construction</li> <li>- Oceanic and foreign marine exploration</li> <li>- Mail service</li> <li>- Forest fire watch</li> </ul>	<b>Protection of US Assets<sup>34</sup></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Stop piracy out of Libya</li> <li>- Assist noncombatant evacuation operation/Boxer Rebellion (China)</li> </ul>
<b>Humanitarian<sup>36</sup></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Berlin airlift</li> <li>- Crop dusting in Los Angeles, Oregon, and the Philippines</li> </ul>	<b>Law Enforcement<sup>35</sup></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Indian uprisings</li> <li>- Pursuit of Pancho Villa (Mexico)</li> </ul>
	<b>Disaster Relief<sup>37</sup></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Flood relief in Texas, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua</li> <li>- Volcano evacuations (Congo and Costa Rica)</li> </ul>

**Figure 2. Historical OOTW**

and in one major regional contingency—Desert Storm.<sup>38</sup> There may be a need to prioritize because of smaller forces and budgets, but to say these missions are beyond the US military is a clear error.

### **Political Experience**

In the view of former secretary of defense Les Aspin, "Operations directed at alleviating human suffering and meeting the needs of victims of social dislocation, economic strife, political conflict, or natural disasters can, in some cases, be the best foreign policy instrument available to the United States."<sup>39</sup> As described above, the national security strategy and the national military strategy state that operations other than war are of high national interest, and they are *specifically designated as military missions*. The strategy does not relegate OOTW to secondary resources, personnel, equipment, or logistics. There is no debate that it is the civilian leadership that determines the country's national interests; that leadership also ultimately determines what the armed forces will be used for. It is true that our leadership chose to deemphasize OOTW when the cold-war challenge was more important. But once that threat changed, more attention could be and has been paid to these "brushfires." If a primary goal is to deter war and deal with threats *before* they become "forest fires," OOTW makes sense. It is a logical arena for preventive diplomacy.

### **Statutory Basis**

Organizationally, the US Army Special Forces were established in the early 1950s to create trained personnel to do OOTW.<sup>40</sup> In 1986 Senators William Cohen (R.-Maine) and Sam Nunn (D.-Ga.) sponsored legislation that mandated appointment of an assistant to the secretary of defense for special operations and low intensity conflict, as well as the creation of a unified command, the US Special Operations Command (SOCOM).<sup>41</sup> Congress has also specifically identified and legislated that the military can be used for noncombat roles. The *United States Code*, Title 10, provides the military with statutory authority for enforcing federal laws, aiding civilian law enforcement, and assisting humanitarian efforts.<sup>42</sup>

### **Regulatory Action**

Strategy and planning for OOTW has been further institutionalized in doctrine and service publications. In particular, Joint Publication 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Operations Other than War*, recognizes that a wide range of operations in peacetime to compel compliance (strikes, peace enforcement, counterterrorism, etc.) is necessary to demonstrate US resolve and capability.<sup>43</sup> A detailed description and definition of each type of activity such as humanitarian assistance, support in counterdrug operations, arms control, and peacekeeping is provided along with examples of each.<sup>44</sup>

### **Moral Basis**

The most recent and emotional rationale for intervention by the US military in peacekeeping and humanitarian actions is that it is morally necessary. This justification has been used despite the lack of clear, direct, or even indirect demonstrations of consequence for US national interests. Nevertheless, as James Holl writes, "There is little mystery regarding where the world's deadly conflicts are or the extent of the damage that they bring. The list is sadly familiar to most informed people."<sup>45</sup> Edward Luttwak argues for intervention on the grounds that if belligerents see that no particular penalty is to be paid for illegal warfare, then restraint erodes everywhere. He also states that the US "moral econ-

omy is damaged if it remains a passive witness to aggressions replete with atrocities on a large scale."<sup>46</sup>

Others add a perspective on societal ethics that goes beyond the international exception that allows intervention in genocide situations. One writes: "In the face of 'ethnic cleansing' and in the face of other circumstances where the chance of escalation to global war is significantly minimized, there may be a higher obligation to intervene."<sup>47</sup>

### **Capability as a Basis**

In late 1996 Gen Dennis Reimer, Army chief of staff, noted proudly that "we've done the Somalias, the Bosnias, the Haitis, the security at the Olympics, and the firefighting in western states . . . and they've all been done well."<sup>48</sup> In speaking about the future, General Reimer referred to the Army's long tradition of doing things other than winning the nation's wars as being the "rapid reaction force for the global village . . . providing a range of military operations short of war."<sup>49</sup> Nation building, responding to natural and man-made disasters, civil disturbances, and civic action projects are all appropriate for a land force which has the flexibility to do a range of missions across a continuum from peace to war.

When it comes to airlift, logistics, surveillance, and maintaining air supremacy, there is no better resource than the US Air Force. Steven Metz suggests that the Air Force would not require any radical changes in force structure to be more active in peace support operations. Adjustment in training and doctrine would be appropriate.<sup>50</sup> The US Navy is capable of maintaining a forward presence, providing the bulk of logistical support, and affecting a rapid littoral response. In summary, the US armed forces are capable of doing OOTW, and it is a legitimate, codified, viable mission.

### **Which Warrior Washes the Windows?**

*The fact that these [military operations] are "other than war" implies that they are less important, significant, costly or deadly. All these assumptions are false.*

—Grant T. Hammond

We now know why the military has done and is going to continue doing operations other than war. But who in the military can actually accomplish these missions without sacrificing the "different" readiness demanded for fighting traditional wars? There has been an obvious and increasingly pronounced emphasis on identifying "special" people to conduct OOTW. President Bush supported improved UN and US peacekeeping efforts to include specifically developed and trained units for unilateral or multinational peace operations.<sup>51</sup> President Clinton called for a UN peacekeeping headquarters, planning staff, and logistics center.<sup>52</sup> The reality is that these operations do compete with more traditional missions for time, personnel, and, more importantly, budget. Can there still be a compromise between having forces ready to fight wars while also being trained and capable of doing OOTW? Boutros Boutros-Ghali, while secretary general of the United Nations, requested member countries to "hold ready, at an agreed period of notice, *specially trained* units for peacekeeping service (emphasis added)."<sup>53</sup> Boutros-Ghali's request provides the namesake answer: *special operations forces* (SOF).

### **OOTW Specialists in the Profession of Arms**

In 1986 Senator Cohen (later to be named secretary of defense) and Senator Nunn conceived the idea that a particular part of the US military should be chartered to carry out counterterrorism, special reconnaissance, psychological operations, and civil affairs. William Boykin states that "Congress was trying to tell the Executive Branch to look beyond the Cold War. More than direct military power is required to cope with terrorism, insurgency, counterinsurgency and other forms of low intensity conflict."<sup>54</sup> Situations in Iran, Grenada, Vietnam, Beirut, and elsewhere drove lawmakers to force the Defense Department to consider a unified combat command for special operations. Subsequently, Public Law 99-661, *The Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987*, directed the formation of the United States Special Operations Command. It created a specific budget for SOF, Major Force



Program 11, and required that SOF commanders in unified commands be general officers.<sup>55</sup> Public Law 100-80, passed in December 1987, and Public Law 100-456, passed in September 1988, established the United States Special Operations Command and authorized the organization's commander in chief (CINCSOC) to develop and procure SOF-unique equipment and direct and control all funds for units assigned to USSOCOM.<sup>56</sup>

### **SOF Doctrine**

Joint Pub 3-05, *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations*, and the 1996 posture statement of the US Special Operations Forces also provide definitive and institutionalized authority for SOF assuming the lead and the supported role in OOTW.<sup>57</sup> The special operations forces are expressly given three purposes in the 1996 defense secretary's report to the president and Congress:

1. Expand range of options for decision makers in crises and conflicts below the threshold of war: for example, terrorism, insurgency, sabotage;
2. Act as force multipliers for conventional forces; and
3. Expand capabilities requiring exceptional sensitivity, noncombatant missions, humanitarian and security assistance, and peace operations.<sup>58</sup>

Doctrine is even more specific as to why SOF should be what CINCSOC calls "warrior diplomats."

SOF are not bound by any specific environment, and SOF missions may be conducted across the entire operational continuum.<sup>59</sup> Originally, five principal missions were detailed for special operations forces: unconventional warfare, direct action, special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, and counterterrorism. Currently, counterproliferation, psychological operations, civil affairs, and information warfare have been elevated to separate principal missions.<sup>60</sup> However, joint doctrine also expressly states that the inherent capabilities of SOF make them suitable for humanitarian actions and for counterdrug and recovery operations.<sup>61</sup> In addition, the 1996 posture statement includes security assistance, countermine activities, coalition support, and

specialactivities.<sup>62</sup> Peacetime military operations are specifically recognized as a method of providing humanitarian assistance or training indigenous personnel to develop a military/paramilitary infrastructure and capability—to remove the underlying causes of armed conflict or war.<sup>63</sup> Within this framework Joint Pub 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, is referenced. For joint tasks it includes such roles as peace building, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peace operations.<sup>64</sup> Clearly, these activities are also within the scope of the windows for special operations.

### **SOF Organizations**

USSOCOM's four component special operations commands (SOC) are the Army Special Operations Command, Air Force Special Operations Command, Naval Special Warfare Command, and the Joint Special Operations Command.<sup>65</sup> The Army is responsible for active and reserve special forces, rangers, special operations aviation, civil affairs, and psychological operations.<sup>66</sup> The Air Force is responsible for worldwide deployment of active duty, guard, and reserve SOF that provide airlift, suppressing fires/close air support, search and recovery, psychological operations, forward arming and refueling, reconnaissance, weather observations, and communications in remote and austere locations.<sup>67</sup> The Navy provides maritime and riverine sea-air-land (SEAL) teams and special boat teams.<sup>68</sup> The Joint Command, established in 1980, is a joint headquarters to study special operations requirements, ensure interoperability/standardization, plan and conduct joint exercises and training, and develop joint special operation tactics.<sup>69</sup>

The SOCs and their resources are organized to be the geographical or theater commander's source of expertise in all areas of special operations, with a separate element to plan and control the employment of SOF. SOC resources are matched to mission requirements, and joint special operation task forces are established when required. SOF units are also prepared to operate with combined forces.<sup>70</sup>

## SOF Capabilities and Competencies

The organizational descriptions of units give some idea of their potential capabilities. But to get a real idea of how these personnel are ideally suited to OOTW tasks, we must look at the manpower skills and equipment that fulfill doctrinal and organizational responsibilities. A summary of SOF characteristics includes:

**Joint Pub 3-05.** – Detailed area or geographical orientation, including mastery of language, customs, and culture.

- Capability to execute all foreseeable operations in the full range of the area's environmental conditions.

- Small units with high levels of personal and professional maturity.

- Experience or training usually in more than one principal field: engineering, medicine, public safety, economics, agriculture, and legal systems.

- *The only civil affairs and psychological operations in the Defense Department (emphasis added).*

- Capability to advise, train, and assist indigenous populations or officials or other US forces in peacetime military operations, hostilities short of war, and war.<sup>71</sup>

**1996 Posture Statement.** – Rapid deployability, flexibility, versatility in penetration and strike capabilities; response with speed, stealth, and precision by land, sea, and air.

- Total Force concept implementation—about 44,000 end strength for FY 97 with approximately one-third from Reserve and National Guard units.

- High retention rates for officers and enlisted personnel—high morale and job satisfaction.

- Training can be institutionalized by service; provided for specific mission tasks, or joint with conventional forces of the US or host nations.<sup>72</sup>

The above is nothing less than a blueprint with specifications in the OOTW contract that are precisely tailored for the military “window” experts. Apparently, and more importantly, there is every intention of improving these capabilities in the future. *Joint Vision 2010* is a plan for how America's military will channel vitality and innovation in its people and leverage technological opportunities to achieve new levels of effectiveness. Four trends are noted: increasing precision of weapons and delivery; increasing the menu of weapons from traditional lethality to non-lethality; increasing stealth and invisibility of our forces; and improving information integration from sensors to

shooters.<sup>73</sup> This embraces humanitarian and peacekeeping missions and the fact that these are already core competencies of special operations forces.

USSOCOM's vision for the future, *SOF 2020*, builds on *Joint Vision 2010* and states, "SOF will be regionally oriented—culturally, linguistically, and politically—while remaining a rapidly deployable, agile, joint force with capabilities ranging from less-than-lethal to precision surgical strikes."<sup>74</sup> SOF will be prepared to respond "asymmetrically to both traditional and nontraditional forms of conflict."<sup>75</sup> This vision provides core characteristics that correspond to the above trends, and it makes SOF the "First Force." The expectations are that "SOF 'Warrior Diplomats' will . . . influence, advise, train, and interact with foreign forces and populations."<sup>76</sup>

Individually, the services have also signed up to the need for dealing with new problems. A Naval Studies Board recommended emphasizing intelligence and psychological operations because of increased Marine Corps involvement with populations ashore (peacekeeping and nation-building operations) and Navy involvement with them at sea (boarding ships, assisting refugees, and countering terrorism). Specifically the report recommended the Marine Corps be included in the capability to integrate "appropriate" Army units into their operations. This was because Army units already had significant competency in dealing with populations, from psychological operations to establishing civil governments and keeping civic order. The committee concluded that "joint" attention to research and technology must be given for subduing populations "in relatively benign ways [using] less-than-lethal means to make them immobile or passive."<sup>77</sup>

In a National Security Report, the Reserve Officer's Association notes that by 2001 the National Guard and Reserve will have been reduced another 20 percent from 1996 levels, but will comprise 3 percent more (35 to 38 percent) of the total military force.<sup>78</sup> More specifically, the total Army will be 50 percent Guard and Reserve personnel which provide the following capabilities:

- **Army Reserve**

- Will have 100 percent of the forces that provide fresh water supply, 95 percent of civil affairs units, 85 percent of medical

brigades, 75 percent of chemical defense battalions, and 70 percent of heavy combat engineer battalions.

-- Will have combat forces for two major regional conflicts (eight divisions, 15 enhanced brigades, three combat units).

**- Air Force Reserve**

-- Will have 80 percent of the aerial port units, 60 percent of tactical airlift and air rescue and recovery, and 50 percent of aerial refueling units.

**- Navy Reserve**

-- Will have 100 percent of heavy logistics support units, 90 percent of the cargo loading units, and 60 percent of the mobile construction battalions.<sup>79</sup>

In March 1996, the reserve officers association reported that the Army National Guard's combat forces far exceeded a two-major-regional-conflict requirement and that less than 10 brigades were necessary for success in war. Therefore, the association recommended that even with the reduction of forces and budget decline, reserve combat forces could be eliminated, some others converted to peace operations, and the readiness of the reserve and total force would not suffer. The point is that these specialty reserve forces could easily and best be employed by integration with the active duty joint special operations forces.<sup>80</sup>

Finally, what are the actual numbers involved in costs and manpower for "doing windows" with SOF versus some other demolition employee? Gen Ronald Fogleman believed OOTWs "don't affect the readiness of the majority of our fighting forces." He stated that of the 391,000 personnel on active duty in the Air Force, 81,000 were forward-stationed in Europe, the Pacific, or Southern Command, but operationally only 10,320 were away from their homes supporting some crisis or contingency. "If you stand back and look objectively at that, 10,320 people out of a force of 391,000 is not very many people."<sup>81</sup> In every operation SOF assets have participated. Further, SOF resources generally constitute a small portion of the Defense Department's budget, with fiscal year 1997 funding at \$3.06 billion. The United States has a ready, highly capable, and flexible joint special operations force that can do missions spanning the entire spectrum of conflict, but they do so with only 1.4 percent of the manpower (46,000 personnel) and 1.3 percent of the defense budget actually dedicated to SOF operations.<sup>82</sup> This last statistic is the evidence that

SOF provides "more bang for the buck" and more efficiency, effectiveness, and force multiplication with which to leverage military capabilities.

### **What's the Window Washer's Recent Past Employment Record?**

On paper, at least, we have seen that the US military and especially SOF should be the obvious and logical choice for operations other than war. Detractors still abound, however, and the reality of many past operations short of war is that they did in fact have problems in their execution and the fulfillment of objectives. Yet, I believe it was not necessarily the use of the military that was wrong, but the way it was used; command and control problems created the issues. Individual and tactical capabilities (will and skill) were less at fault than the lack of clarity or knowledge of the strategic objectives. An assessment of various operations follows.

**Vietnam.** In hindsight, some may argue that strategically the Vietnam conflict was a "broken window" that conventional forces did not, or could not, fix, given their limitations. However, studies of how some aspects of the Vietnam War were prosecuted are significantly positive.<sup>83</sup> For example, the Marine combined action platoon (CAP) program in South Vietnam has been judged as having "worked superbly."<sup>84</sup> A CAP had 35 men: 20 local Vietnamese militia, 14 US marines, and a Navy corpsman trained in customs, courtesies, culture, and language. They shared ideas, lived together in Vietnamese hamlets, and expanded civic action programs.<sup>85</sup> CAP marines worked with the US Agency for International Development, the Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere (CARE), and the Catholic Relief Service.<sup>86</sup> Between 1965 and 1968, CAPs enhanced cohesion and reliability of South Vietnamese militia forces and had some tactical successes in eliminating Vietcong influence.<sup>87</sup> Lt Gen Lewis W. Walt, commander of the Third Marine Amphibious Force in 1965, recalls the instructions to those going to Vietnam to "temper the fight with an understanding of the people, compassion towards them, and the exercise of good works in the midst of war."<sup>88</sup>

**Somalia.** Refugees running for their lives, burdening their neighbor's food supply and economics; rampant crime; loot-

ing; and blockages of civilian relief efforts drove US intervention in Somalia in 1992.<sup>89</sup> President Bush's objective was limited to "opening the supply routes, to get the food moving, and to prepare the way for a UN peacekeeping force to keep it moving. This operation is not open-ended."<sup>90</sup> Stopping the dying was a fundamental objective. Ultimately, however, a shift to nation building and then to taking sides seems to have occurred under the Clinton administration.<sup>91</sup> But was the failure of achieving the "new" objectives due to inappropriate use of military force, or was it more due to using the military for more risk-oriented roles without anticipating increased casualties? It is inconsistent to want to use force and expect to do so risk free. The real test is minimizing losses by using the right assets, the right way, at the right time, and for the necessary length of time. Chester Crocker makes the point that at least Somalia was "left better than we found it."<sup>92</sup>

**Bosnia.** The jury is still out for the most part on the continuing operation in Bosnia. However, the first ground mission (UN Protection Force) attempt at peacekeeping and delivering food, water, and medical supplies was successful. Special operations forces played a key role in initiating contact with the parties for civil affairs and humanitarian relief. Fred Hiatt writes, "What was done was far more useful than doing nothing. . . . Some military missions may be justified if they improve a situation without curing it."<sup>93</sup> Unfortunately, the implementation force (IFOR) assumed the mission of peace enforcement and had to create a secure environment before nation building, restoration of the economy, elections, refugee resettlement, and arms control could proceed. According to William Johnsen, this operation has been a benchmark with the one-year deadline forcing the factions to resolve issues rather than IFOR and other international organizations having to do it all.<sup>94</sup> Implementing the military provisions of the Dayton accords is proceeding more smoothly than expected, but the civil elements are not. Johnsen's conclusion is emphatic as far as this window of the world is concerned: "Military forces . . . have played a critical and successful role in halting conflict and bringing stability to the region [and] the basis of a lasting settlement will depend to a significant degree on the ability of an outside military force . . . that provide[s] unique capabili-

ties essential for conduct of the mission (e.g., attack helicopters, intelligence, theater communications, civil affairs, and psychological operations).<sup>95</sup> This is clearly an endorsement for a well-trained SOF taking the lead.

Retired general John Shalikashvili reminds us that stabilization in Bosnia has been working, and although IFOR required 17,000 troops, the follow-on force was to be 8,500 in 1997 and only 5,500 in 1998.<sup>96</sup> Critics contend the military is ill suited to nation building in Bosnia, but peace is still being maintained and at acceptable cost. Christopher Shepherd responds to concerns that OOTW missions take time from training in other combat missions with the assertion that the benefits outweigh the costs/risks. He concedes that there may be some inability to execute combat missions if policy makers do not recognize a need for force structure adjustments; however, a relatively small decrease in proficiency on some combat tasks has been offset by more than a year of relative peace in a historically violent region.<sup>97</sup> Lastly, Gen George Joulwan, former supreme allied commander of NATO forces and commander of US Forces in Europe, stated that the Bosnia deployment "has helped [troop] readiness. In the area of communications, intelligence, and logistics, readiness has gone up and reenlistments are higher than the Army's goals because of the troops' sense of mission and purpose."<sup>98</sup>

**Panama and Northern Iraq.** An analysis of two other operations also contributes evidence that SOF are essential for OOTW and that results would have improved if they had been the supported (or lead) force rather than the supporting force. Operation Promote Liberty in Panama was primarily a nation-building operation to re-establish democracy in Panama in conjunction with Operation Just Cause, which was to remove Manuel Noriega. The major effort required setting up a trained civilian police force. Deficiencies included legitimizing the civilian government too soon, premature and uncoordinated interagency transition of responsibilities, and a lack of civilian capabilities in training/maintaining indigenous assets. According to Maj James Klingaman, those problems would have been resolved or precluded with SOF oversight. Operation Provide Comfort in northern Iraq provided assistance to the Kurdish refugees fleeing Saddam



Hussein's repression with a facet of peace enforcement. Though the conventional forces ran a successful operation, Klingaman's analysis argues that special operations were the "glue that [held] the operation together, provided it synergy," and kept lines of communication open to all involved.<sup>99</sup> These cases make strong arguments for institutionalizing SOCOM for future humanitarian operations.

**Other Windows.** Indirect US military intervention also contributed to positive results in El Salvador. US support took 11 years, and it cost \$6 billion and 20 American lives, but the final result was a democratic government with improved human rights and market reforms. This civil war assistance was low profile and supported by a long-term commitment. It succeeded because the right military arm (special operations) had the opportunity, training, and ability to do the task of counterinsurgency.<sup>100</sup>

Another successful employment of SOF capabilities occurred in the military training program in formerly Marxist Mozambique during July 1996. This was a "low-key" operation involving 11 members of the Third Airborne Group, US Special Forces, focusing on small units and leadership.<sup>101</sup> And we should not forget the Marine expeditionary unit (special operations capable) that reinforced the US embassy in Liberia for four months in 1996, ensuring security and resupply while disorder ruled the day.<sup>102</sup> Finally, it is to be noted that special forces, providing unique support, transportation, and communication to the military operation and mission in Ecuador and Peru, have kept the remote border dispute there quiet since a brief war arose in 1995.<sup>103</sup>

## What Waits for Warriors and Windows?

*[Our foreign policy successes have occurred] because we refuse to listen to those who said that with the Cold War over America could choose escapism over engagement. . . . The fact is America remains the indispensable nation. There are times when America, and only America, can make a difference between war and peace, between freedom and repression, between hope and fear. Of course, we can't take on all the world's burden. But where our interests and values demand it and where we can make a difference, America must act and lead.*

—President William Clinton

The foundation of the world's "house" does not appear threatened by any major catastrophe in the next 25 years. Yet, numerous uncovered windows are chipped, broken, or fracturing. A few insights and perceptions from senior operators are useful. General Reimer, the Army chief of staff, expects that "operations other than war are going to be the norm, the nation needs an adequate number of soldiers to do those missions, and if we trade off too much end strength, later we will pay that bill in blood."<sup>104</sup>

The former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), General Shalikashvili, believes the military must change with the changing demands on the world and the United States. He argues that interventions like Bosnia, Haiti, and Rwanda must be included in future plans even though they are not a direct threat because we must "make sure we shape the environment in such a way that these lesser threats to our lesser interests don't grow . . . into something worse."<sup>105</sup> Retired general John Vessey, another former chairman of the JCS with 46 years of military service, echoes General Shalikashvili: "Forces are needed to defend against 'big accidents' that could grow out of little accidents like in the past—and there are a lot of those out there."<sup>106</sup>

The former Air Force chief of staff, Gen Ronald Fogleman, acknowledges that the use of military forces for peacekeeping and other nonwar-fighting operations "is a reality that needs to be addressed as a part of the QDR [quadrennial defense review], especially 'lesser regional contingencies' . . . like those carried out in Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda." He states that during the last major defense strategy review in 1993, known as the "Bottom Up Review," these operations were not an issue because they were handled ad hoc—an approach using leftover forces that needs to change.<sup>107</sup> Gen Charles C. Krulak, commandant of the US Marine Corps, is of the opinion that the Marines have always had the lead in doing "such other things as the President may direct," and he is proud to have the Marine Corps improving on these OOTW even with reduced strength and budget. He adds that "within three blocks you can have a soldier wrapping a baby, spreading one's arms to separate sides or defending himself with arms,

and the military has to change its socialization to do this."<sup>108</sup> Of singular importance are the expectations of Defense Secretary William Cohen. He stresses that deployments for peacekeeping and humanitarian missions will continue. "While we are not and cannot be the world's policeman," he says, "neither can we become a prisoner of world events, isolated, tucked safely away in a continental cocoon."<sup>109</sup>

### **Expert Recommendations**

The military, and especially the Special Operations Forces, clearly meet the future employment contract specifications and expectations of our nation's strategy based on their core competencies and capabilities. However, the experts also have identified concerns from a force structure perspective and have provided relevant suggestions for maintaining readiness as resources decline. Retired general Fred Woerner advises that "consolidating (the cold war) victory requires a continuing US role and new strategies to strengthen democratic institutions."<sup>110</sup>

General Fogleman states that based on realities, force structure should be shaped to better handle operations other than war: "You ought to equip them and focus them on nonwar-fighting missions." His formula for the future American force structure is one capable of winning one-and-a-half major conflicts. Others would be left to handle one-half or one-quarter challenges, which may require meeting the national security challenges with an expansion of expeditionary mobile forces.<sup>111</sup> General Reimer recommends more psychological operations and civil affairs personnel as well as security police, combat support, and combat service support units, because the new style of war requires a different fighter.<sup>112</sup> The former chief of the JCS also realizes that though US troops are not prepared to be international policemen, their new roles represent a change that the QDR should consider in designing future forces.<sup>113</sup> The consensus is that more specialists in OOTW are necessary and that "war readiness" or ability to respond to fighting the nation's wars need not suffer.

William Mendel notes that civilian agencies cannot handle OOTW tasks because they have neither an adequate response to military force used against them nor the organizational or logistical assets for large operations. Therefore, he makes a number of suggestions. First, there should be a standing joint military planning staff for OOTW with apportioned forces that would be trained to join with government, nongovernment, and international organizations in dealing with operations short of war. If this arrangement were made permanent, with an established command structure, the command would develop expertise in interagency and international matters, act unilaterally or with others, be cost-effective, and avoid the degradation of readiness in conventional forces by relieving them of OOTW missions. Mendel recommends that liaison representatives from private, interagency, and nongovernmental organizations work with his idea of a "joint engagement command (JEC) reporting directly to the national command authorities or serving as a subunified command of USSOC." Organized functionally, his JEC would have reserves playing a major role, supplying engineering, medical, civil affairs, security police, security assistance, and logistics components in addition to special operations personnel that include psychological operations and intelligence units. Mendel believes that by "better organizing what is now on hand" we would not create more force structure, and "the Armed Forces could remain undeveloped by OOTW missions, free to concentrate on training for decisive battles of annihilation."<sup>114</sup> Mendel's principles are sound, but creating a JEC would duplicate an effort already available in USSOC and add another layer of unneeded military bureaucracy.

One last observation comes from a white paper by the Strategic Aerospace Warfare Study Panel. That paper assumes that militarily, at least until 2025, no single power or combination of hostile powers will develop to match and challenge US superiority. Any attempt to challenge the US would be evolutionary and visible enough to allow sufficient reaction time for meeting any spectrum of warfare.<sup>115</sup> Thus, a force structure with a greater ratio of SOF, integrated with Guard and Reserve personnel (who do a great

portion of OOTW already), will be better able to do all the nation's assigned "windows" as well as have plenty of time to take care of the "house." SOF are force multipliers. Their expertise, maturity, and technology allow them to accomplish more tasks with fewer numbers. Their demonstrated ability to work within the Total Force concept and with coalition forces and indigenous personnel further reduces the numbers of active duty US forces required. Our special "subcontractors" in the profession of arms are more efficient and effective in doing the growing assortment of "odd jobs" than our general contractors are.

## Conclusion

*Peacekeeping is not a mission for soldiers, but only soldiers can do it.*

—Boutros Boutros-Ghali

The above quote has two facets. First, peace operations (or any other OOTW) are not the normal missions the armed forces as a whole are groomed for. Second, soldiers can do OOTW, have done them and done them well, and should do even better in the future when the force structure is properly adjusted for these taskings. In fact, without a military threat to the nation's survival on the horizon, it is now more critical to have the capability to deter war and exercise preventive diplomacy than to have a force unable to react to anything but war. Unfortunately, there are still many who oppose having the military do anything but prepare for total war, and it would be surprising not to find most of them within the military. Frankly, it is time to stop complaining. Operations other than war are tasks the military has done for a long time, even in periods of austerity. Now that resources are again constrained, but the world's threats have proliferated, there is every reason to keep those programs which represent effective, efficient, and intelligent methods of realizing our national security objectives.

Windows (OOTW) are already within the US military's contractual obligations, and their relevance is likely to increase through predictably greater US participation in United Nations-sanctioned operations. Special operations

units and organizational structures are in existence to meet foreseeable contingencies. Special forces are primarily staffed to work in a joint, combined, and interagency way. All that is needed is an emphasis on expanding special operations forces, including the continued integration of Guard and Reserve personnel. The numbers do not have to be large—technology, training, and talent allow more to be accomplished with less, and mass applications of force will not be needed anyway. Operational tempo for all forces can be reduced, and yet, if combat operations are necessary, the core of conventional warriors will still be ready. More importantly, SOF are trained to be involved in a broad spectrum of conflict. They can quickly make the transition to combat readiness from a very restrictive conflict environment, thereby reducing the need for a large standing military of just “war fighters.”

We must not lose sight of the fact that with an ever-broadening definition of national security, the US military should not be solely burdened with doing these windows. Global security now requires efforts on the part of international governmental agencies, private volunteer organizations, private organizations, and other instruments of power from around the world. The SOF have a special dedication and capability to deter escalation of conflict by involvement in operations other than war. They are, or should be, the basic building blocks for “engaging and enlarging” as befits our national security strategy.

In this post-cold-war world, without a major threat, OOTW should be considered “windows of opportunity” for helping to stabilize the world, promoting social and economic equity, and minimizing or containing the disastrous effects of failed states. Let us not merely pay lip service to warrior diplomacy.

We conclude this study with an observation from Lt Col Robert Poyner: As “we move from adolescence to adulthood, [we] put simpler things behind us and enter a far more complex, sophisticated world . . . and realize that many nontraditional taskings . . . (e.g., humanitarian relief, peacekeeping, peacemaking, counternarcotics, etc.) nestle quite well under the framework of projecting influ-

ence, which could be a helping hand just as easily as a fist."<sup>116</sup>

### Notes

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